In this paper we focus on immigration, as it is the most visible aspect of globalization. It is not evident that immigration is responsible for many of globalization's economic effects. Economic displacement may well be due to other less visible events and decisions. An industry goes offshore, machines replace labor in its production processes, or a firm's products become obsolete or uncompetitive and stop selling as they once did. Or a government fails to adopt policies to adapt to these changes or cushion the blows that may fall on some sectors of the economy.
Still, immigration puts a recognizable face on events that may well be properly attributable to other forces. For that reason attitudes toward immigrants are significant as an indicator of pain caused by less visible forces of globalization. And as recent events in the advanced democracy, immigration can trigger backlash against opening societies to external competition.
1 Immigration opens to view the 1 For example, a recent and important study of attitude change in the UK begins this way: "In May 2014, immigration overtook the economy as the leading concern of British voters. The UK Independence Party (UKIP), campaigning on a platform of immigration control, came first in the May European elections with 27.9 per cent of the vote, two and a half points ahead of Labour, four more than the Tories. This was an unprecedented achievement for a third party in British reality of new people coming into the workplace and the community, upsetting existing material and cultural expectations, perhaps even undermining the sense of security. The presence of people speaking incomprehensible languages, dressing strangely, and observing unfamiliar religious practices, can be threatening even if one is not suffering. People may simply resent the presence of new and different people in public spaces and sometimes feel as if they are losing control of "their" country. In that sense, the presence of large numbers of immigrants may raise issues of national or civic "identity" --"who are we as a people?" or, "do these people share our values?" 2 Not surprisingly such concerns often lead to opposition to increases in immigration.
In this paper we attempt two projects. The first is to try to explain immigration attitudes by taking account of two likely causal factors: economic dislocation and threats to identity or cultural values. We argue that, while economic dislocation and cultural conservatism each produce anti-immigrant attitudes, the effect of culture or identity is probably stronger. The second project seeks to understand the effects of immigration attitudes on prospective and retrospective political choices by political leaders and parties. We argue that the immigration issue has exposed an enormous vulnerability of traditional parties either to internal fracture or entry by new parties or political leaders. Before turning to our analysis we turn to developing a parallel between the period we are living through and the time when the emerging world economies engaged on vast project of globalization.
***
We can learn some hard lessons from the first globalization era -roughly from 1850 to 1912-13 -and how it ended. The expanding economies of the world drew vast migrations of workers from other less vigorous economies around the world. In the United States and Canada six and thirteen percent of the population were immigrants. And that was nothing compared to Argentina's 43 percent. 3 In many cases employers actively recruited workers in Eastern and Southern Europe both to supply workers in politics. Since 2002, immigration has typically ranked among the electorate's top two priorities." Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris, Changing Places: Mapping the British Response to Ethnic Change. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Changing_places_-_web.pdf, p.9.
The same issues have arisen in the current, second, great transformation of the world economy. 8 Scholars have shown that immigration attitudes are related to economic vulnerability. "People with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question." 9 Other studies have shown other ways that economics plays a role in shaping a country's views toward immigration. 10 In addition to the economic impact of globalization on attitudes toward immigration, cultural and psychological variables also come into play when explaining contemporary attitudes toward immigrants.
11
Immigration has once again become an explosive issue in the developed countries and especially in those with democratic traditions. We think that this partly because democratic institutions generally permit the rapid translation of social dislocations into political voice. Vol. 52, No. 4, 11 Brader, T., Valentino, N., and Suhay, E., 2008, "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 959-978. among existing parties. This seems especially likely given the linkages that some politicians seek to make between immigration and public safety and the refusals to accept the received 'social contract.' In this respect immigration attitudes and the political reactions to them have potential systemic effectsas they did during the first globalization.
We are already seeing signs that established party system are not managing these new forces very well. Openings have been found, both on the Left and the Right, to new political actors. The appeal of these new players is not fully comprehensible in traditional left-right discourse. Rising political leaders increasingly seek votes by appealing to notions of national "identity" or unity -by proposing protectionist and anti-immigrant policies. The appeal of these policies cuts across the party lines in every country, breaking down traditional political distinctions between left and right and shifting the political discourse to a fight between the Center and the Periphery, where the Center consists of the traditional "governable" parties and Periphery is made up of outsiders represented by new parties (which may be left or right in coloration depending on the national context). This displacement of traditional parties has increasingly been accompanied both by the distrust of the political class and, at the same time, the rise of new and threatening political leaders, who seek to appeal directly to the "people" in some sense. At the same time, this popular appeal involves a controversial definition of who the proper people actually are: the identity of the nation if you will. We do not know how far these changes will go of course, but they appear to have potential 'constitutional' ramifications in every country, undermining traditions of representative government in favor of something else. *** Our study is based on a new dataset that offers a unique perspective on the roots of the antiimmigrant reactions to the second globalization. Over the period from March of 2015 to June of that year we conducted, through YouGov polling, a survey of seven nations -U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, France and Germany -that asked the same questions about immigration and other issues to about 1,000 respondents in these seven advanced industrial democracies. While each country is interesting on its own, this set of countries varies widely in several important respects that might be relevant to immigration attitudes. Five are members of the EU (so far); four of those inside the Euro and Schengen areas. Three are, to some committed to what is sometimes called the Anglo Saxon model of "flexible" labor markets and a common law legal system. The other countries have much more active government labor market policies. The electoral and party systems also vary widely:
where some countries use variants of majority or plurality rule to elect representatives and others employ forms of proportional representation. A case can be made that each country is "exceptional" in some sense. But each also shares characteristics with others so that we can hope to isolate some institutional effects that do not depend on particular country characteristics.
Given that the surveys were administered prior to the Syrian diaspora, our paper might serve as a kind of baseline for future studies that might take account of more recent events. However, the really unique feature of this study is its extensive battery of questions permitting respondents to place themselves and political parties on the same scale. Placement data will allow us to ask about the effects of immigration attitudes on placements and, ultimately, on vote intentions. Moreover, we can carry out this assessment within the framework of the two prominent theories of voting found in the political science literature: Prospective and Retrospective voting models.
Obviously the YouGov sample is a cross section and so we can say little about attitude dynamics.
However, the different countries were at different places in the business cycle in the spring of 2015 so that our measures of "country effects" may incorporate some cyclic elements, though fixed effects can also pick up cultural or other intercountry differences.
12 Thus, if we want to learn about attitude change we really need a follow-up survey.
Describing Attitudes toward immigrants.
There are several research questions that we can begin to answer with the present data sets 14 To be clear, the first two variables are dummies separating respondents picking the anti-immigration stance (1) on that issues from those who do not (0). The index is a sum of these two dummies, counting how many times respondent has taken the anti-immigration stance (0, 1, or 2). On the integration question, on which responses are measured on a 7-point scale, we considered as anti-immigration respondents placing themselves on the 5, 6, or 7 points (all those more antiintegration than the central value of 4). On the level question, which has three possible responses (increase it, decrease it, and keep the current level), we considered as anti-immigration those respondents stating they want to decrease it (again, all those more anti-immigration than the central value -keep it as it is, in this instance). 15 We should point out Muslims in France had been there for a long time and were mostly citizens whereas those in Denmark had mostly arrived after 1990, with larger flows coming after 2000, and most had not become citizens and indeed many did not speak Danish. survey respondents especially in contemporary Europe. Moreover, as can be seen, even if the percentage of immigrants is small, as it has been in Italy, the number may have risen quickly over a short time period and may be more salient for that reason. 
Explaining Immigration Attitudes
Our theory is that immigration attitudes are driven, in part, by how "threatened" one feels by immigration. We think this has (at least) two dimensions (or at least two that we have some hope of measuring): economic threat and cultural threat. The theory is that those who feel threatened in one of these two ways will tend to adopt more anti-immigrant attitudes. This theory is not completely novel.
Economists have long argued that the structure of an economy would tend to make immigration have more or less negative impacts on some workers. 18 Sociologists have produced studies, which emphasize cultural factors. 19 We think this theory fits pretty well with the behavior perspective, which emphasizes that loss aversion is a powerful motivation both in forming attitudes and taking action.
Economic Explanations
Economic accounts of immigration attitudes focus on who suffers harm from competition from immigrants. This question can be posed in different ways: examining which sectors or skills are exposed to competition (either factually or theoretically), or asking for subjective judgments by respondents. We can call the first method "objective" and the second "subjective." We emphasize that the objective approach usually builds on controversial economic theories or controversial application of those theories. 20 The approach we take in this paper is subjective in that it asks respondents about changes in their economic situation or changes in the situation of their economy and seeks to relate those responses to immigration attitudes.
Our data present us with some plausible economic measures. It asks each respondent whether the economy has gotten better or worse over the last year; and it asks the same question about the respondent's family financial situation. We also created an anti-immigration measure based on respondents' answers to our questions. Thus in this analysis we analyze anti-immigration views only.
To be anti-immigration a respondent has to be for encouraging immigrants to leave the country, or for decreasing the level of immigration. The following two tables (3 and 4) summarize the effects of economic judgments on anti-immigration attitudes. Table 3 shows the effects of the dichotomous economy get worse (W) or it did not (NW), while Table 4 shows the results for those whose family economic circumstances either weakened (W) or did not weakened (NW). We focus, first, on the anti-immigration Index and notice that Denmark and the U.K. (and perhaps Canada) are distinct from the other countries in that neither anti-immigrant attitude depends strongly on how either the economy's or the family's financial situation has changed. 21 Note that in Denmark and
Canada the values of the anti-immigration Index are at the low end (less than 25) while in the U.K.
regardless of economic changes the attitudes are much more anti-immigrant. In the other four countries the gap between those thinking the economy is worse and those who don't is at least 13 points and in the U.S. the numbers are 45.9 to 17.0.
However, things get more complicated if we examine the two attitudes separately and if we distinguish "sociotropic" from family centered judgments. For example, in France, Germany, Canada, and the U.S., those who think the economy has worsened are more likely to want to reduce immigration levels. In the U.K. and Italy, three quarters of the respondents want to reduce the numbers of immigrants however they think the economy is doing. Turning to the family centered judgments complicates the picture somewhat. In France, Germany, Italy and the U.S. bad family outcomes reduces support for integrating immigrants into the society. The correlation is smaller for Canada and the U.K. and is negative for Denmark. Except for Italy and the U.K. worse family outcomes support reducing immigration levels.
We also asked respondents how they saw the unemployment situation in their country. 22 The respondent may report unemployment as normal (N) or abnormally high (H) and the results are shown in Table 5 .
23 22 Again, question wording is reported in Appendix A. 23 We considered as worried (W) respondents saying unemployment was "somewhat high" or "very high", while those saying it was "normal", "somewhat low" and "very low" were coded as non-worried (NW). Once again the criterion for being assigned a trait (in this case worried about the unemployment) is being beyond the central position (in this case "normal").
The figures in this table (5) look roughly like those in Table 3 . Respondents in Canada, Denmark and the U.K. do not become more anti-immigrant when they believe that unemployment is very high, although again, Canada and Denmark are much less anti-immigrant than the U.K. In the other four countries those perceiving unemployment as abnormally high were more anti-immigrant, with regard both to level and integration. The similarity of findings to those regarding the impact of overall economic judgments is to be expected as both tables pose a sociotropic question: asking about the economy and unemployment in general and not about their own family's circumstance.
We attempted to summarize the total effect of the economic variables by creating an index combining judgments on unemployment, perception of the national economy, and status of family income. Table 6 summarizes overall economic effects by examining an economic performance index which counts how many times out of the three economic perceptions the respondent has been coded with a 1 (worse or worried) value. The results are clear: in Canada and the U.K. immigration attitudes are not positively related to negative economic judgment; in Denmark the effect may even be inverted. Moving from zero negatives to three negatives in these three countries does not increase anti-immigrant attitudes. In Germany, Italy and the U.S., however, each step up the economic Index produces an increase in both anti-immigrant variables. Overall it appears that anti-integration attitudes respond strongly to negative economic judgments in France, Germany, Italy and the U.S. There are only weak effects in Canada, With respect to Levels, economic judgments make no difference in Denmark and the U.K.
Cultural or Identity
The literature on immigration attitudes is quite divided on what culture is and how to measure it.
We see three basic positions: one is that culture is a deep and stable feature of a people that regulates how they see and make sense of their social world and their own place in it. As such, culture is thought to be widely shared among the population rather than an individual level variable. A second view sees culture as an attitudinal complex that is shaped in many ways and which may or may not be stable over long or even short periods, and may vary across individuals as well. The third view is a mixture: culture itself is stable as in view one but its elements may vary in their salience to people depending on events and individual circumstances, as in view two. Our data do not allow us to examine these views in any detail. Our intuitions, however, run strongly in the direction of View Three but we cannot rule out either of the other interpretations.
Whichever view is taken, a central aspect of a culture has to do with collective identity: who are the people? Who is entitled to be "here" and to have a voice in how things are done? 24 Obviously people in any culture have difference conceptions of collective or national identity and are attached to it in different ways. Some views are more accommodating to new arrivals than others. There are two questions in our data set that seem to us to get at cultural conservatism -a sense that the culture is threatened by change or heterogeneity of the kind that might come with immigrants (though, not necessarily from them). We think of it as a diffuse attitude rather than one focused specifically on immigrants (a new survey might seek to get better measures of specific threats that immigrants might bring to the culture). In any case, we think that cultural threat is likely to respond to the Level of immigration more than to the business cycle. The two examples we use are attitudes to Gay Marriage and Support for the Death penalty. 25 The following tables (7, 8 and 9) show how these attitudes are related to immigration attitudes. 24 Of course cultures also support conceptions of individual identity such as appropriate age, sex, occupational roles and how each person sees herself in relation to them. While the YouGov data do not permit close examination of this, we think it very likely that immigration can pose challenges to individualized identities as well. 25 See question wordings in the Appendix A. Eric Kaufmann has argued recently, when examining various correlates of pro-Brexit votes, "...what really stands out (...) is the importance of support for the death penalty. Nobody has been out campaigning on this issue, yet it strongly correlates with Brexit voting intention. This speaks to a deeper personality dimension which social psychologists like Bob Altemeyer (...) dub Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). A less judgmental way of thinking about RWA is order versus openness. The order-openness divide is emerging as the key political cleavage, overshadowing the left-right economic dimension. This was noticed as early as the mid-1970s by Daniel Bell, but has become more pronounced as the aging West's ethnic transformation has accelerated (...) 71 percent of those most in favour of the death penalty indicated in 2015 that they would vote to leave the EU. This falls to 20 percent among those most Table 7 shows that death penalty attitudes are strongly related to both of our immigration attitudes.
Across both the integration and the level variable, those favoring the death penalty are more strongly anti-immigrants, ranging roughly from 2 to1 to 5 to 1. The only exceptions are that for Italians there is little effect on the desired immigration level; and for the Danes, where those with a negative attitude toward the death penalty are more anti-integration than those favoring it. However, in Denmark people in favor of the death penalty also favor reducing the level of immigration more than those who are opposed to the death penalty. It must be something in the aquavit. Indeed, looking at the summed Index, the effect of death penalty attitudes on immigration is fairly strong in every country.
opposed to capital punishment. Karen Stenner, author of the Authoritarian Dynamic, argues that people are divided between those who dislike difference -signifying a disordered identity and environment -and those who embrace it. The former abhor both ethnic and moral diversity. Many see the world as a dangerous place and wish to protect themselves from it." http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/07/09/not-economy-stupid/. We think that Gay Marriage and Death Penalty attitudes reveal negative attitudes toward deviations from social norms and may be taping into Stenner's idea. And insofar as immigrants are thought to deviate from legacy norms in some ways, we expect these judgments to be correlated. Table 8 shows that the effect of attitude to gay marriage on immigration attitudes and the patterns are pretty clear in every country: those opposing gay marriage are more anti-immigrant. This is true for both the integration variable and the level variable. The size of the difference varies. For instance, looking at the anti-immigration index, we notice that it ranges between a very small difference in Canada (roughly 6 percentage points) to a high of about 27 points in France and in the U.S. In short,
having an anti gay marriage attitude is related to anti-immigration attitudes.
In Table 9 we sum the culture variables as we did the economic variables, with zero being pro gay marriage and anti death penalty, two being the opposite, and one being either of pro death penalty or anti gay marriage but not both. The effects, using the constructed cultural conservatism index, are that despite country differences, there are clear and strong effects for cultural conservatism as we measure it. 26 Here across all seven countries only Denmark does not have a stepwise increase in anti-immigration as cultural conservatism increases and even it is consistent on the level variable. 27 Indeed, comparing these results to Table 6 (The Economic Index), it seems likely that the effect of cultural conservatism is stronger than the effect of economic adversity. We now turn to a comparison of the cultural and economic variables. Table 10 presents a multivariate analysis of the effects of cultural conservativism and economic "hardship" controlling for SES variables and country fixed effects, (we do not display those controls in the table). We use the economic index created for Table 6 and the cultural conservativism index used in Table 9 for our index variables. For the sake of comparability in the coefficients, we have recoded both There is evidence that, despite efforts at integration, Danish policy has been less welcoming to Muslims than other countries in our sample: Kaergård reports that only Germany and Italy have more restrictive rules for integration than Denmark's." In an overview, the policy in 12 different areas (rules for family reunification, for refugees, residence permits, possibilities of citizenship, etc.) for different countries are compared with the Danish rules and are classified as equal to, or more or less restrictive than, the Danish rules. (...) Sweden is, for instance, not more restrictive than Denmark on any of the 12 measures, is equally restrictive on four of them, and is less restrictive on eight. This makes Denmark the most restrictive of (Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, U.K., Canada, Finland), though it is not very different from Germany." 27 Leaving aside anti-immigrant attitudes this poses a challenge to the Danish welfare state: "It is no doubt a problem for the Danish welfare state that considerably fewer non-western immigrants have work and pay taxes than is the case for the rest of the population. A welfare state of the Danish type is built on the implicit assumption that people will work and pay taxes for a period of their lives and receive support from the public purse when they are children or elderly, or if they become sick. The net balance of transfers to the public purse is negative for non-western immigrants as a group. Fewer are in work and more live on public transfer incomes than is the case for the remainder of the population; of the non-western immigrants and second-generation immigrants, only 55 percent of males and 41 percent of females are in employment, compared with 81 and 75 percent respectively of males and females of Danish ethnic origin..." Kaergård, op cit.
regressions. In the third column the dependent variable is our anti-immigration index variable, which has three values, thus it is an ordered logistic regression analysis. The results across all three analyses show that both cultural and economic variables play independent and significant roles in accounting for anti-immigration attitudes. The cultural variables (as measured by death penalty and gay marriage attitudes) have the statistically larger effect. Indeed, we believe that these results may underestimate the power of culture/identity on immigration attitudes.
For example, in our analysis of economic effects, we counted sociotropic attitudes as part of our economic index, but an argument could be made that the willingness to make and be guided by sociotropic judgments in forming attitudes reflects a cultural disposition.
28 Fixed effects and SES controls were included but not reported here. We need to remark that all of our regressions support the common finding that education is negatively related to anti-immigrant sentiments even controlling for our variables. The same holds for the effects of income. Some have argued that this effect ought to be ascribed to "culture" rather than the economy where the "culture" in this case is the culture of educated, or wealthier, people. An alternative interpretation would say that educated or well off people tend to be fairly insulated from the negative economic consequences of immigration (or will tend to be well positioned to benefit from them). These tendencies, if they exist, seem to be merely contingent claims about correlations. We take no position on that debate here. Here country fixed effects are operationalized through country dummies. We replicated these regression allowing both slopes and intercept to randomly vary by country in multi-level regression analyses. Findings are reported in the Appendix B (see Table A1 ) and generally confirm what is presented here.
The Politics of Immigration: Two models
The object of our study -the more important one in our view -is to examine the ways in which the political systems have responded to (or channeled) immigration issues. This question can be asked at several levels. Do immigration attitudes shape electoral outcomes, or party programs? Or do they affect the structure of the party system itself in ways we suggested at the start -by displacing traditional left-right politics with a center-periphery, or even a system vs antisystem cleavage? Or, does the threat of such a displacement, lead mainstream parties to push reforms in the electoral system? We think that any or all of these are live possibilities.
The survey asked respondents to place themselves and their country's political parties according to various issues. Table 11 contains average party placements on immigration issues. We have selected all parties above 10% of the votes in previous general national elections. The party placements correspond more or less to how we would think the parties would be placed on these issues. The major conservative or center-right parties, in every country, were significantly more anti-immigrant on both of our measures than their center-left opponents. In the case of Denmark, U.K., and France, where there are relevant nationalist anti-immigration parties, they were placed highest on the anti-immigration scales. Secondly, taking differences between center-left and center-right parties on the two variables, we can see there is a very strong positive correlation between differences on integration and differences on levels (the correlation is .7 and, if Denmark were dropped the correlation is .93). Therefore, at the national level there is reason to think that party placements on both dimensions of the immigration issue are both meaningful and closely connected to one another. We think, therefore, that these data form a reasonable basis for comparing party and self-placements of voters. Given that respondents seem to be able to locate the various parties' positions on the immigration issues, we turn to the question of how partisan respondents place themselves relative to their placement of their party (Figure 1) . We use the 0/1/2 anti-immigration index used above to determine the extent to which partisans' personal positions correspond to where they placed their party. Again, a 0 means respondent had no anti-immigration positions, a 1 means one of two anti-immigration positions, while 2 is antiimmigration on both issues. The 0/1/2 for placement of parties is exactly the same. We confine the original analyses for the two major center-left, center-right parties before proceeding to analyze third parties in the five countries with three or more relevant parties.
The results reported in Figure 1 suggest a striking fact: party leaders (who we can assume are driving party placements to some extent) have positioned their parties in more pro-immigrant positions than their adherents. In all countries, both establishment parties are more pro-immigrant than their partisans. In some countries (Canada and the U.K.) both parties are perceived by their adherents as much more pro-immigrant than their partisans themselves, while in some like the U.S. and Italy one of the parties is much more pro-immigrant than its adherents. It seems clear enough that this situation, plainly visible early in 2015, shows that many of the main parties are vulnerable to the immigration issue. Specifically, mainstream parties may suffer from events that make immigration more salient and pro-immigration stances less popular. We are seeing this, now 29 In Canada the letter C stands for the Conservative Party and L is for the Liberal Party. In Denmark, the letter A is for the Social-Democratic Party and V for the Left, Denmark's Liberal Party. In France, S represents the Socialist Party, and R The Republicans. In Germany, S is for the SPD and C for the CDU-CSU. In Italy D represents the Democratic Party, and FI is for Go Italy. In the U.K. the letter L is for Labour Party, and the C for Conservative Party. In the U.S. D is for the Democratic Party, while R represents the Republican Party. it seems, both in the U.S. with Donald Trump's candidacy and in Europe with the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Across the developed world voters seem to think that the traditional parties do not have answers for immigration problems. Not to say it too loudly, but these data (from the spring of 2015) mark a harbinger of what was to come in Europe! It seems important to emphasize that shift of partisans away from their parties on immigration is general and includes nearly all the system parties on which we have data.
What about those parties, not included in Figure 1 ? All three anti-immigrant parties (FN in France, UKIP in the U.K., and the Danish People's Party) are perceived by their own adherents as much more anti-immigrant than other parties in the country. And, indeed, the party position in those cases is much closer to the position of their partisans. In France partisans of the FN were at 1.8 where 2.0 is as high as you could go on the scale, while in the U.K partisans of the UKIP also placed themselves around 1.8.
The difference between the two of them is that in France the party was perceived by its partisans to be even more anti-immigration (only instance in which this happens), while in the U.K. the roles are reversed with partisans slightly more anti-immigrant than the party. The only other anti-immigrant party, the Danish People's Party, was not as extreme ( 1.2) 
Retrospective voting model
Now we can examine the effects of immigration attitudes on how people vote in elections. As we have pointed out, the establishment parties tend systematically to be more pro-immigrant than their partisans. This seems to place them in a vulnerable position if popular attitudes shift in an antiimmigrant direction. In the first model in this section we take a "retrospective" view of elections and ask whether a party pays a price for being out of step with those who voted for it. We can define party loyalty as the propensity to vote for the same party that they voted for last time and look only at loyalty to parties for various levels of immigration attitudes. The question of how the immigration issue affects individuals' vote for his or her party is shown in Table 12 . We calculated how far a respondent is from her preferred party 30 (the one voted in previous national general elections) and see that against the probability they would vote for that party in the future 31 .
The results show that both distance on immigration level and integration have independent negative and significant effects on vote propensity for the respondents' preferred party (no matter what of the two alternative distances, objective or subjective, we look at). The further one is from their preferred party on both dimensions the less likely they will be to vote for that party in future elections, as measured by the future vote propensity question. Again, regardless of whether measured objectively or subjectively, the distance on the integration variable has a coefficient twice the size of the immigration level. It could be that this result is due to reactions to immigrants who are already in the country and are not yet fully assimilated according to the respondent, making the integration problem more immediate in time than future immigration. Subsequent work will have to determine whether that is true. It is, nevertheless, true that a retrospective model that places weight on immigration attitudes has explanatory power compared to models that do not. This is a warning to establishment political leaders that deviating from party supporters' views on immigration (which are generally more conservative than party leaders) can threaten reelection. not have this measure for those respondents failing to place the party. This is a particularly relevant issue when many distances are used in a single analysis, as in Table 13 , where this strategy results in a significant drop in the number of observations. The alternative, which allows to overcome this problem and use all respondents who placed themselves, consists in using the average placement of the party in the whole sample as the reference point to calculate the distance. This is the "objective" distance. 31 To measure this probability we used the Expected-Vote-Frequency scores collected in the 7-countries CISE-Hoover Insititution Comparative Partisanship Survey. For each relevant party, respondents were asked how often they will vote for it in the future. Complete question wording is reported in the Appendix A. To perform the tests reported in Table 12 we created a dichotomous dependent variable scoring 1 if the highest Expected-Vote-Frequency was for the party voted in previous elections, 0 otherwise. 32 Again, fixed effects and SES controls are omitted. We also included a PID dichotomy, scoring 1 if respondent declared voted party was the party she feels particularly close to, 0 otherwise. See question wording in the Appendix A. Here country fixed effects are operationalized through country dummies. We replicated these regression allowing both slopes and intercept to randomly vary by country in multi-level regression analyses. Findings are reported in the Appendix B (see Table A2 ) and generally confirm what is presented here.
Prospective voting model
We can now turn to a prospective voting model. We use the vote propensity variable but now instead of just analyzing the respondents' preferred party, we include their propensity to vote for all parties, in a stacked data matrix 33 . Because each respondent appear several times, as many as the parties she has assigned a vote propensity score to, in the following table we need to take account of correlation in the error structure. Table 13 presents two ordered logit analyses of the propensity to vote for a party as a function of the distance between the party and the respondent on each issue, plus the Left-Right scale. The left hand column presents the results for "objective" differences -where we define the party position as the average placement of the party in the whole sample. The "subjective" difference -the difference between the respondent's self-placement and her placement of the party -is in the right hand column. The analysis is clustered by respondent in order to correct for correlated errors. As above we suppress the SES controls and country fixed effects. The last row of the table
shows that respondent's distance from a party on the Left-Right dimension is a powerful predictor of vote propensities as would be expected if voting behavior were largely driven by a one-dimensional model. The results in Table 13 show that, even after controlling for party-respondent distances on the LeftRight dimension, issue distances also have strong effects on the vote propensity. And particularly so on immigration issues. On both level and integration the coefficients for party-respondent distance both objectively and subjectively defined are highly significant. The only other specified issues for which this is true are income inequality, and minimum wage where the sign is also negative. Thus, over nine issue positions, the two immigration questions stand out, suggesting that while politics in these countries is multi-dimensional, the effects of immigration attitudes are a real and powerful determinant of vote preferences.
Conclusions
We argued in the introduction that it is important to put the immigration issue in the context of the more general phenomena of globalization. Globalization has two aspects: the first is economic, exposing local workers to world-wide labor markets and specifically to competition from workers in emerging nations. The second is cultural -by increasing diversity and threatening cultural norms and a sense of identity. Our study suggests that the fear of diversity is a very powerful determinant of immigration attitudes, independent of economic factors. These two phenomena are linked of course and nowhere more so than in immigration practice and policy. We hasten to add, however, that immigrants are not the only (and perhaps not the most) important source of perceived diversity. In some countries diversity issues arise from long-time citizens and other residents, who have refused to or been prevented from fully assimilating to the majority culture, independently of immigration rates.
In this paper we used a seven-nation survey to ascertain the countries' attitudes toward immigration in regard to levels of immigration and integration into the country. The results showed differences across countries but, concerning the causes of these attitudes, both economic frustration and cultural anxieties appear to play a role. The most innovative part of paper is in connecting immigration attitudes to politics. We were able to show that political parties, at least those with prospects for joining a government, were systematically more pro-immigrant than their voters. This makes these parties vulnerable to competition from anti-immigrant parties, especially when immigration concerns intensify. We also estimated the effect that disagreement between respondents and parties on immigration issues have on voter's propensity to vote for parties they had previously supported, showing that parties lose votes because of their divergence from the immigration preferences of their previous supporters. This probably makes parties less willing to take pro-immigrant positions than they might otherwise be. In other words, even as parties reveal themselves as more pro-immigrant than their voters, this may actually understate the divergence.
Moreover, when we analyzed the respondent's vote propensities prospectively the results showed that, even controlling for the traditional left-right factor and other issue distances, immigration issues have an impact on future vote dispositions. These results -retrospective and prospective -raise the question of whether immigration has the chance to become a realigning issue in modern democracies.
We can only raise that issue here without settling it. Our hope is that these results, particularly the political implications, can become a baseline for future research.
In addition to the social science implications of our study there are also public policy implications.
There has been a powerful surge of anti-globalization political sentiment, which has spawned significant new political patterns: the candidate of the Republican Party promises to erect protectionist barriers around the American economy; the British electorate voted to exit the European Union; and 35 John Sides and Jack Citrin, "European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 477-504 across Europe anti-immigration and anti-trade parties and movements are rising. To some extent this is a bottom-up phenomenon but new political leaders have begun to exploit it ways that may threaten the postwar political consensus. It is important to understand where the opposition to trade is coming from.
This research shows that in large part those who perceive themselves as having lost out economically are more anti-immigrant. In addition, cultural conservatives are more anti-immigrant than are social liberals across all of our countries. Together, these groups appear to make up a large part of the electorate in many advanced democracies. The fact that all establishment political parties in our survey have taken positions that are more pro-immigration than their own supporters makes them particularly vulnerable to anti-system or periphery parties. While it may be a good thing from a policy perspective, that "governable" parties tend to take pro-global positions, the political consequences could be catastrophic. We have seen this movie before; it ended with isolation and beggar the neighbor policies or with democratic collapse. Neither of the endings is very pleasant.
We do not relish playing Cassandra. But our research shows that many voters willing to vote against parties they have supported in the past unless their party adjusts its position. Policy makers need to take heed of this and move cautiously lest they generate trends, which would be similar to those that ended the first transformation of the world economy. Immigration issues are especially treacherous now, when many of the major economies are mired in economic slowdowns and as the Middle Eastern wars have fueled a flood of people seeking places in safer and more prosperous societies. Perhaps the best policy advice is to try to fix these issues without doing too much damage to our values or our economic prospects and hope that immigration politics will become less treacherous than it is today. As always, politics is the art of the possible. More than that is too much and too dangerous to wish. 
